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Coming Out of the Venire: Sexual Orientation
Discrimination and the Peremptory Challenge
Jessica Satinoff

*

We, the people, declare today that the most evident of truths—that
all of us are created equal—is the star that guides us still; just as it
guided our forebears through Seneca Falls, and Selma, and
Stonewall . . . . It is now our generation’s task to carry on what
those pioneers began. . . . Our journey is not complete until our
gay brothers and sisters are treated like anyone else under the law.
––President Barack Obama1
I. INTRODUCTION
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* J.D. candidate, 2016, Florida International University College of Law; B.A., 2012, University
of Central Florida. I would like to thank my mother, Miryam, for her unconditional support and
encouragement. I would also like to thank Professor Howard Wasserman for his guidance throughout
the writing process. Finally, a special thanks to the editors of the FIU Law Review for publishing my
Note.
1
President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3
See Jason Matthew Lamb, The Constitution, Peremptory Challenges, and United States v.
Martinez-Salazar, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 843, 843 (2001).
4
See id.
5 See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511
U.S. 127 (1994).
6
See Giovanna Shay, In the Box: Voir Dire on LGBT Issues in Changing Times, 37 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 407, 451 (2014).
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The United States Constitution provides that all criminal defendants
are entitled to a speedy and public trial before a fair and impartial jury.2 In
order to ensure that the accused receive an impartial jury, peremptory
challenges allow a party to remove potentially biased members of the jury
pool during voir dire.3 Voir dire allows lawyers to inquire into the
prospective jurors’ attitudes, beliefs, morals, and views related to issues that
will likely arise during trial.4 Historically, there have only been two
limitations on a party’s ability to strike a potential juror through the
peremptory challenge: race and gender.5 One would be hard-pressed to
contend that sexual orientation should not be a third.6
Batson v. Kentucky, decided in 1986, first established that peremptory
challenges may not be exercised to remove a prospective juror solely based
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13

Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
See generally J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127.
See id. at 129.
See id. at 130–31.
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 79.
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
See id.
See id. at 2684.
See Shay, supra note 6, at 451.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
See id.
See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014).
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on race.7 In 1994, the Court established the second limitation on a party’s
ability to strike a potential juror through peremptory challenges.8 In J.E.B.
v. Alabama, the Court held that gender was also an unconstitutional proxy
for determining a juror’s competence and impartiality.9 The Court reasoned
that gender discrimination during voir dire perpetuates invidious and
antiquated stereotypes regarding the aptitude of men and women.10 To date,
Batson has only applied to discrimination during voir dire based on race
and gender.11 In recent years, however, sexual orientation discrimination
has generated significant legal headway.12 In United States v. Windsor, for
example, the Supreme Court struck down the federal Defense of Marriage
Act’s (DOMA) ban on recognizing same-sex marriages.13 The Court
affirmed the Second Circuit’s judgment, which applied heightened scrutiny
to DOMA’s classification based on sexual orientation.14
Although the Court never expressly stated that it was applying
heightened judicial review, its ruling indicates implicit application of
heightened scrutiny.15 This is evinced by the majority’s position on the
meaning of the constitutional guarantee of equality—“that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify
disparate treatment of the group.”16 The Court went on to explain that
discrimination of such an unusual character requires careful consideration,
which indicates its application of a standard higher than rational basis
review to scrutinize sexual orientation classifications.17 Several courts,
including the Ninth Circuit, have held that the logic and reasoning of
Windsor implicitly requires the application of heightened scrutiny to equal
protection claims involving sexual orientation.18
Federal circuit courts of appeals have expressed opposing views
regarding the applicability of Batson to peremptory strikes based on sexual
orientation. The Ninth Circuit, in SmithKline Beecham Corporation v.
Abbott Laboratories, recently held that peremptory strikes used to
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation may be challenged under
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See id. at 471.
See United States v. Ehrmann, 421 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Sneed v. Fla. Dep’t. of
Corr., 496 Fed. App’x 20 (11th Cir. 2012).
21
See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U.L. REV. 197, 198 (1994).
22
See id. at 208.
23
See Jill Elaine Hasday, Women’s Exclusion from the Constitutional Canon, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1715, 1731–32 (2013).
24
See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 471.
20
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Batson.19 Yet, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Ehrmann, and the
Eleventh Circuit, in Sneed v. Florida Department of Corrections, expressed
serious doubt as to whether Batson’s scope extends beyond race and
gender.20
Batson should be extended to sexual orientation discrimination
because such discrimination is simply a form of gender discrimination,
which is already prohibited by the Court’s decision in J.E.B. v. Alabama.21
If conduct is prohibited when engaged in by a person of one gender, yet
permitted when engaged in by a person of the opposite gender, then, by
definition, such a prohibition is discriminatorily based on sex and
traditional gender roles.22 In the alternative, Batson challenges should be
applicable to discrimination based on sexual orientation because of the
similarities between gender and sexual orientation, as well as the equal
protection implications found in Windsor.23 The Ninth Circuit holding in
SmithKline, while not binding on other circuits, is highly persuasive and
should be adopted by all other circuits in light of the Windsor decision.
Because the Court in Windsor implied that sexual orientation is subject to
heightened scrutiny review, peremptory strikes on this basis should be
afforded the same protections as race and gender during voir dire.24
This Note will examine the equal protection implications of Windsor
and consider the rationale for extending the Batson analysis to sexual
orientation discrimination. Part II of this Note will provide a history of
peremptory challenges in the United States and the evolution of the Batson
analysis. This Part will also address the various competing interests that
should be considered, including the rights of the litigant and the excluded
juror. Part III will discuss sexual orientation discrimination jurisprudence,
the standard of judicial review for sexual orientation, and the rationale for
applying heightened scrutiny to classifications that single out individuals
for disparate treatment based on their sexual orientation. Part IV will
analyze peremptory challenges in relation to sexual orientation and the
circuit split among various federal circuit courts of appeals regarding the
applicability of Batson to peremptory challenges solely based on sexual
orientation. This Part will also discuss the rationale supporting the
extension of Batson to sexual orientation. Part V will provide
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recommendations to eliminate sexual orientation discrimination during voir
dire and conclude with potential consequences if the Supreme Court does
not adopt these recommendations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Peremptory Challenge

25
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Y K
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U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See JAMES J. GOBERT ET AL., JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART AND SCIENCE OF SELECTING
A JURY § 10:1 (Westlaw).
27
See id.
28
See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 447 (1996).
29
See id.
30
See Coburn R. Beck, The Current State of the Peremptory Challenge, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 961, 963 (1998).
31
See Kathryn Ann Barry, Striking Back Against Homophobia: Prohibiting Peremptory Strikes
Based on Sexual Orientation, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 157, 160 (2001).
32
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
26
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The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a
trial by an impartial jury.25 To impanel such a jury, lawyers engage in the
process of voir dire, during which each lawyer is afforded the opportunity
to question jurors and decide which prospective jurors will be selected to
hear the case.26 Prior to the commencement of trial, each party’s lawyer
attempts to identify potential jurors that may be biased and have such jurors
struck, either for cause or through a peremptory challenge.27 Parties may
exercise an unlimited amount of challenges for cause, which are used to
excuse prospective jurors who are unlikely to be fair and impartial during
the case being heard.28 In order to exercise a challenge for cause, a party
must provide the court with an explanation for challenging the juror, and
the judge must then decide whether the prospective juror should be
removed based on his or her inability to be fair and impartial.29
The peremptory challenge, as distinguished from the challenge for
cause, allows a party to strike a prospective juror from the venire without
providing the court any justification for the strike.30 Essentially, a party
exercises a peremptory challenge when the party believes that a prospective
juror will be biased for reasons that cannot be articulated to the court.31
While a party may typically exercise peremptory challenges without cause,
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits parties from exercising peremptory
challenges solely on account of race or an assumption that racial minorities
as a whole will be unable to serve as impartial jurors in a case against a
racial minority defendant.32 The peremptory challenge was further limited
based on the Court’s finding that gender has no bearing on an individual’s
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See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89; J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129.
35
See Beck, supra note 30, at 964.
36
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24.
37
FED. R. CIV. P. 47.
38
See Beck, supra note 30, at 964.
39
See Vivien Toomey Montz & Craig Lee Montz, The Peremptory Challenge: Should It Still
Exist? An Examination of Federal and Florida Law, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451, 454 (2000).
40
See Patricia Henley, Improving the Jury System: Peremptory Challenges, PUBLIC LAW RES.
INST., http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/plri/juryper.pdf.
41
See Montz & Montz, supra note 39, at 455.
42
See id.
43
See Henley, supra note 40.
44
See id.
45
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
34
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competence and ability to serve as an impartial juror.33 Today, a party may
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove prospective jurors for any
reason, aside from the individual’s race or gender.34
The number of peremptory challenges each party may exercise is
defined by statute and, therefore, varies by jurisdiction and case type.35 In
federal criminal cases, courts allow twenty peremptory challenges per party
in a capital case, six peremptory challenges for the government and ten for
the defendant in all other felony cases, and three peremptory challenges per
party in misdemeanor cases.36 In all civil cases, federal courts allow each
party to exercise three peremptory challenges.37 Most states have enacted
statutes that permit parties to exercise peremptory challenges in similar
numbers and type as the federal courts.38
Originally, the peremptory challenge was established to eliminate
unqualified and biased members from the jury pool.39 Peremptories date
back to Roman times and were implemented under English common law as
well.40 The British peremptory challenge was brought to the early American
colonies and was subsequently adopted by all states.41 Initially, most states
regarded the peremptory challenge as a right of the defendant and were
slow to extend this right to the prosecution.42 Since its inception, the
peremptory challenge has been rooted in the tradition of the United States
and has served as an indispensable tool for impaneling an impartial jury.43
The peremptory challenge ensures fairness during jury selection,
complements challenges for cause, and safeguards the voir dire process
from biased jurors.44 It serves to eliminate extreme bias and prejudice on
both sides of a case, as well as to “assure the parties that the jurors before
whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed
before them, and not otherwise.”45 In her concurring opinion in J.E.B. v.
Alabama, Justice O’Connor opined that the significance of the peremptory
challenge is evinced by its establishment during the time of Blackstone and
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its continued endurance in all the states.46 Traditionally, peremptory
challenges allowed parties to exclude a prospective juror for any reason;
however, the Court’s evolving jurisprudence has placed limitations on the
peremptory challenge.47 Today, parties may object to a peremptory
challenge if they believe that the opposing party discriminatorily exercised
the peremptory challenge to exclude the member from the venire solely
based on race or gender.48
B. Evolution of Batson v. Kentucky

46

C M
Y K

06/27/2016 12:34:37

See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See Esther J. Last, Peremptory Challenges to Jurors Based on Sexual Orientation:
Preempting Discrimination by Court Rule, 48 IND. L. REV. 313, 315–16 (2014).
48
See id.
49
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
50
See id. at 82.
51
See id. at 83.
52
See id.
53
See id. at 84.
54
See id. at 100.
55
Id. at 86.
47
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Batson, a landmark Supreme Court case, established the framework
that prevents peremptory challenges from being used discriminatorily
during voir dire.49 In Batson, an African-American man was accused of
committing burglary and receiving stolen goods.50 During jury selection,
the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four AfricanAmerican individuals, resulting in a jury comprised solely of white
individuals.51 Batson was found guilty on both counts and appealed his
conviction, arguing, inter alia, that the prosecutor discriminatorily
exercised peremptory challenges to remove individuals from the venire
solely because of their race.52 The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his
conviction, holding that a defendant must demonstrate systematic exclusion
of a group of prospective jurors in order to allege lack of a fair cross-section
of individuals serving on the jury.53
The Supreme Court of the United States held that if the trial court
found that the facts established prima facie purposeful discrimination, and
the prosecutor did not provide a neutral explanation for his action, Batson’s
conviction must be reversed.54 The Court reasoned that the Equal Protection
Clause forbids the prosecutor from striking potential jurors solely based on
their race because it denies a defendant “the protection that a trial by jury is
intended to secure.”55 The Court highlighted its prior efforts to eradicate
invidious racial discrimination during voir dire and noted that such
discrimination harms not only the accused, but also the community at
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See id. at 85.
Id. at 87, 89.
58
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (9th ed. 2009).
59
See id.
60 See Clair F. Rush, How to Make and Defend Against a Batson Challenge, DRI (Mar. 14,
2012), www.dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=299.
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
64
See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 476 (9th Cir. 2014).
65
See id.
66
See id.
57
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large.56 Ultimately, the Court held that peremptory challenges may not be
used to strike a prospective juror solely on the basis of race because
practices that intentionally bar individuals from serving on juries due to
their race “undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of
justice.”57
Today, the Batson challenge is commonly understood as one party’s
objection that an opposing party has exercised a peremptory challenge to
remove a prospective juror from the venire exclusively on account of race
or gender.58 The principle of Batson now applies in both criminal and civil
cases.59 Procedurally, a party may raise a Batson challenge as soon as it
believes the opposing party has exercised a peremptory challenge
discriminatorily to remove a potential juror.60 Once the jury has been
impaneled, asserting a Batson challenge would be superfluous because the
excluded juror can no longer serve on that jury.61 If the court denies a
party’s Batson challenge, this issue may be raised on appeal, so long as the
record has been adequately preserved for appellate review.62
The legal significance of the Court’s decision in Batson is two-fold.
First, the Court established a three-part inquiry to determine whether
impermissible discrimination has occurred against a potential juror during
voir dire.63 In order to establish that such discrimination has occurred, the
party challenging the peremptory strike must first establish a prima facie
case of intentional discrimination.64 The striking party must then provide a
neutral, nondiscriminatory reason for the strike.65 Finally, the court must
decide, based on the record, whether the party raising the challenge has
demonstrated intentional discrimination.66
Second, Batson established the elements necessary to make a prima
facie showing of intentional discrimination during jury selection. First, the
challenging party must demonstrate that he or she is a member of an
identifiable group and that the striking party has exercised peremptory
challenges to excuse members of the challenging party’s group from the
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See Batson, 476 U.S. at 80.
See id.
See generally Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
See id. at 403.
See id.
See id. at 410.
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
See id. at 129.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 129, 131.
See id. at 134.
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jury pool.67 Second, the challenging party must prove that the facts and
surrounding circumstances raise an inference that the striking party actually
did exercise peremptory challenges to remove the prospective jurors
exclusively based on their membership in the cognizable group.68
Under the Equal Protection Clause, a defendant may also raise a
Batson challenge to the exclusion of jurors based on race, regardless of
whether the defendant and the prospective jurors are members of the same
race.69 In Powers v. Ohio, the defendant, a white male, objected when the
prosecution exercised six of its ten peremptory challenges to remove black
individuals from the jury pool.70 The trial court overruled Powers’
objections, and he was convicted of murder.71 The Supreme Court held that
a defendant may raise a third-party equal protection claim for jurors
excused solely based on their race.72
Almost a decade after Batson, J.E.B. v. Alabama extended the threepart analysis to gender-based discrimination.73 In J.E.B., Alabama filed a
petition on behalf of the mother of a minor child to establish paternity and
child support against J.E.B.74 The State exercised nine of its ten peremptory
challenges to excuse male jurors, and J.E.B. exercised all but one of his
challenges to excuse female jurors.75 The resulting jury was comprised
solely of female jurors.76 The jury found J.E.B. to be the minor child’s
father, and the court ordered him to pay child support.77 The Supreme Court
held that “gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror
competence and impartiality.”78 The Court noted that the logic of Batson
also forbids purposeful discrimination on account of gender because such
discrimination perpetuates “invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes
about the relative abilities of men and women,” in contravention to the
Equal Protection Clause.79 The Court explained that excluding cognizable
groups from serving on juries is inconsistent with the constitutional
construct of trial by jury.80

C M
Y K
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86

See id. at 131.
See id. at 135.
See id. at 136.
See id. at 140.
See id. at 143.
See Montz & Montz, supra note 39, at 455–56.
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 159 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id.
See id. at 159–60.
See id. at 160.
See id. at 159.
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Gender discrimination is a relatively recent phenomenon because
women were historically precluded from serving on juries.81 The Court
observed that, while the discrimination that women and racial minorities
have experienced in the United States have not been identical, the
similarities between the groups’ experiences support the extension of the
Batson analysis to discrimination based on gender.82 The Court recognized
that women, much like African-Americans, have experienced a history of
exclusion and discrimination in American society.83 As it did in Batson, the
Court affirmed the notion that discrimination during jury selection harms
not only the litigants, but also the community and prospective jurors who
are prohibited from participating in the judicial process.84 Ultimately, the
Court held that gender-based discrimination during voir dire does not
further the State’s interest in achieving a fair and impartial jury.85
While the Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized the
peremptory challenge as a fundamental instrument in obtaining an impartial
jury, not all justices have taken the same position.86 In his dissent in J.E.B.
v. Alabama, Justice Scalia criticized the majority’s position that peremptory
challenges based on any cognizable group subject to heightened scrutiny are
inconsistent with the constitutional guarantees of equal protection.87 Scalia
argued that because all classes are subject to peremptory challenges,
essentially no class is denied equal protection.88 Strongly opposing the
Court’s reasoning in J.E.B., Scalia noted that for every male that was
excused by the government, the petitioner excused a female.89 Therefore,
Scalia concluded that there was no gender discrimination, because both
genders were being excused through peremptory challenges
evenhandedly.90
Scalia would have likely opposed extending Batson to sexual
orientation, just as he opposed applying it to gender, because peremptory
challenges have existed in conjunction with the Equal Protection Clause for
over a century.91 Because peremptory challenges are used to excuse both
heterosexuals and homosexuals equally, Scalia would have likely argued
that neither group is denied equal protection under the Fourteenth
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Amendment.92 This argument, however, fails to consider the emphasis that
our society has placed on eliminating invidious discrimination entirely, as
exemplified by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.93
C. Balancing Interests During Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges

92
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See id. at 160.
See generally U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
94
See Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily Waive
Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 401–06 (2010).
95
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 108 (1986).
96
See id. at 85.
97
See id. at 86.
98
See id.
99
See id. at 87; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 127 (1994).
100 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991).
101 See Paul R. Lynd, Juror Sexual Orientation: The Fair Cross-Section Requirement, Privacy,
Challenges for Cause, and Peremptories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 231, 258 (1998).
102
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
93
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In Batson and its progeny, the Court has had to balance several
interests in prohibiting the discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges during voir dire.94 The first, and most significant interest, is the
defendant or civil litigant’s constitutional right to a fair trial before an
impartial jury.95 The Court has held that the State violates the Equal
Protection Clause when members of the defendant’s race have been
intentionally excluded from serving on the jury.96 Such discrimination
violates a defendant’s equal protection rights because it contravenes the
very safeguard that a trial by jury is intended to provide.97
Second, when a prospective juror is excused through a peremptory
challenge, the juror’s rights are at stake as well.98 The Court has recognized
that preventing a prospective juror from participating in the administration
of justice solely based on race or gender is unconstitutional discrimination
against the excluded juror.99 Allowing citizens to contribute to the judicial
process has long been regarded as a fundamental justification for preserving
the trial by jury system in the United States.100 Courts have recognized that
jurors have privacy interests during jury selection, and have begun to
impose greater restrictions on the scope of voir dire questioning based on
such privacy interests.101
Finally, the Court has often commented on the far-reaching
consequences of discriminatory practices during jury selection.102 In
addition to the harm that such discrimination inflicts upon litigants and
excluded jurors, discriminatory peremptory challenges undermine public
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confidence in the fairness of the judicial system.103 Ultimately,
discrimination during jury selection “offends the dignity of persons and the
integrity of the courts.”104
III. SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION
A. Sexual Orientation Discrimination Jurisprudence

103
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See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87; see also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140.
Powers, 499 U.S. at 402.
105
See Eric A. Roberts, Heightened Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause: A Remedy to
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 485, 486 (1993).
106
See id.
107
See id.
108
See id. at 498.
109
See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
110
See Andrea L. Claus, The Sex Less Scrutinized: The Case for Suspect Classification for
Sexual Orientation, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 151, 156 (2011).
111
See id.
112
See id. at 157.
113
See id.
104
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The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community has
experienced both private and public discrimination throughout history.105
While private discrimination is difficult to remedy, public discrimination
that singles out sexual minorities based on their sexual orientation should be
eliminated.106 Despite the constitutional guarantees of equality, the LGBT
community is a minority group that is still subject to governmentsanctioned discrimination today.107 While society as a whole has shifted
toward acceptance of homosexuality, many individuals continue to harbor
negative attitudes toward sexual minorities, which harm the LGBT
community in public ways.108
The Supreme Court first addressed discrimination based on sexual
orientation approximately thirty years ago in Bowers v. Hardwick.109 In
Bowers, the Court upheld a state statute that criminalized sodomy,
reasoning that disapproval of homosexual conduct was deeply rooted in the
tradition of our country, and that the State had a legitimate interest in
prohibiting such conduct.110 This case is illustrative of society’s historical
moral disapproval of sexual minorities and the history of discrimination
they have endured.111 Approximately ten years later, there was a sea change
in the Court’s sexual orientation discrimination jurisprudence.112 In Romer
v. Evans, the Court invalidated a state constitutional amendment that sought
to prohibit government protection of sexual orientation.113 The Court
implicitly authorized state antidiscrimination statutes to include sexual
orientation as a protected class, but only applied rational basis review in
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doing so.114 Scholars have argued that the Court’s treatment of sexual
minorities as a class under the Equal Protection Clause prompted several
states to amend their antidiscrimination statutes to include sexual
orientation as a protected class.115
The Court eventually overruled Bowers in the notable case of
Lawrence v. Texas.116 Lawrence was convicted for engaging in “deviate
sexual intercourse” with a member of the same sex, in violation of a state
statute outlawing same-sex sexual conduct.117 Although Lawrence was
decided on due process, rather than equal protection grounds, it represents
the first Supreme Court ruling in which the Court defined sexual minorities
as being a cognizable group, which supports the application of heightened
judicial review.118 The progression of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
regarding sexual orientation discrimination demonstrates the shift in public
attitudes toward sexual minorities.119 The Bowers decision reflected
society’s historical moral disapproval of homosexuality, while Romer and
Lawrence evinced society’s shifting views toward acceptance of
homosexuality.120 Despite this societal shift, sexual minorities still
experience discriminatory treatment in housing, public accommodations,
and the workplace today.121 This discrimination reflects the need to provide
heightened protection for sexual orientation classifications under the Equal
Protection Clause.
B. Standard of Judicial Review for Sexual Orientation
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See id.
See id. at 157–58.
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See id. at 158.
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See id. at 161.
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See id.
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See id.
122
See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
123
See generally Bowers, 478 U.S. 186; Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
124
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015).
115

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 96 Side B

Traditionally, discrimination based on sexual orientation was subject
to rational basis judicial review by the Supreme Court.122 Although the
Court has heard several cases pertaining to sexual orientation
discrimination, it has generally applied rational basis review,123 or declined
to explicitly state what level of judicial review it was applying.124 Because
of the ambiguity created by recent Supreme Court decisions, it is helpful to
consider the emerging trend of state courts applying heightened scrutiny to

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 97 Side A

06/27/2016 12:34:37

10 - SATINOFF_FINAL 6.12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Coming Out of the Venire

6/12/16 11:52 PM

475

classifications that discriminate based on sexual orientation.125 According to
a fifty-state survey provided by the American Bar Association, at least five
states protect jurors from discrimination based on their sexual orientation,
as of 2013.126
In 2008, the California Supreme Court became the first high court in
the country to hold that classifications discriminating based on sexual
orientation deserve the same protections under the law as classifications
based on race and gender.127 In reaching its decision, the court explained
that there was no persuasive reason to apply a less rigorous standard for
statutes that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation than the standard
applied to statutes that classify on the basis of race or gender.128 The court
reasoned that
[b]ecause sexual orientation, like gender, race, or religion, is a
characteristic that frequently has been the basis for biased and
improperly stereotypical treatment and that generally bears no relation
to an individual’s ability to perform or contribute to society, it is
appropriate for courts to evaluate with great care and with
considerable skepticism any statute that embodies such a
classification.129
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125
See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 783-84 (2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 2009); Griego v. Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, 316 P.3d 865, 884 (N.M. 2013).
126
See Shmuel Bushwick, Excluding Gay Jurors After Windsor, AM. BAR ASS’N SEC. OF LITIG.
(Nov. 7, 2013), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/lgbt/articles/fall2013-1113-excludinggay-jurors-after-windsor.html.
127
See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th at 783–84.
128
See id.
129
Id. at 757 (emphasis added).
130
See Shay, supra note 6, at 411.
131
See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 289 Conn. 135, 141 (2008).
132
See id. at 165–66.
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Although this case was later superseded by constitutional amendment, it
demonstrates the paradigm shift in societal views toward classifications
based on sexual orientation.130
Subsequently, the Connecticut Supreme Court also held that sexual
orientation is a quasi-suspect class under the Connecticut Constitution.131 In
its analysis, the Connecticut Supreme Court delineated factors for
determining whether a classification is suspect or quasi-suspect, including
whether a class has experienced a history of discrimination, whether the
characteristic associated with that class is related to an individual’s ability
to participate and contribute to society, whether the characteristic is central
to an individual’s personal identity, and whether the class is a minority or
lacks political power.132 The court found that members of the LGBT
community are a minority class that have suffered a history of
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See id. at 179.
See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); see also Griego v. Oliver, 316
P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013).
135
See, e.g., Varnum, 763 N.W.2d 862; see also Griego, 316 P.3d 865.
136
See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 896.
137
See id.
138
See Griego, 316 P.3d at 884.
139
See id.
140
See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 975 (2006).
141
See id. at 974-75.
142
See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 605 (2007).
134
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discrimination and held that laws discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.133
High courts across the United States began applying heightened
judicial review to classifications based on sexual orientation, much like
California and Connecticut.134 In 2009, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
classifications discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation are subject
to heightened scrutiny, without specifying whether it was applying
intermediate or strict scrutiny.135 The court observed that members of the
LGBT community have suffered from centuries of public discrimination.136
Accordingly, the court held that in order to prevent the perpetuation of
historical prejudice and stereotyping, laws that single out individuals for
disparate treatment based on sexual orientation are subject to heightened
judicial review.137
In 2013, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that intermediate
scrutiny should be applied to classifications based on sexual orientation
because the LGBT community is an identifiable class that has suffered from
a history of intentional discrimination and has not been able to protect itself
from such discrimination through the legal system.138 The court reasoned
that because an individual’s sexual orientation is so essential to one’s
identity, it would be inappropriate to require an individual to alter his or her
sexual orientation to avoid discrimination.139
While many state supreme courts have held that classifications on the
basis of sexual orientation are subject to heightened scrutiny, this position
has not been uniformly adopted by all high courts across the country. The
Washington Supreme Court, for example, held that sexual orientation
discrimination is not subject to heightened scrutiny.140 The court refused to
apply heightened scrutiny because sexual orientation has not been declared
immutable, and because the implementation of provisions providing
protections to the LGBT community in Washington demonstrates that they
are not powerless, but are actually exercising substantial political power.141
The Maryland Court of Appeals similarly held that classifications based on
sexual orientation are not subject to heightened scrutiny.142
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See Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of
Marriage Act, DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 23, 2011), www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congresslitigation-involving-defense-marriage-act.
144
See id.
145
See id.
146
See id.
147
See id.
148
Id.
149
See id.
150
Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality)).
151
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 143.
152
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
153
See id. at 2683.
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In a press release from the Attorney General prior to the Supreme
Court ruling in United States v. Windsor, the Executive Branch adopted the
position that sexual orientation classifications should be subject to
heightened review.143 In evaluating the aforementioned factors articulated
by the Supreme Court, the Attorney General first recognized that there has
been a significant history of purposeful discrimination against the LGBT
community, by both the government and private entities.144 Such
discrimination is rooted in prejudice and stereotypes that continue to harm
the LGBT community today.145 Second, the Attorney General noted that
although sexual orientation is not readily apparent, it is widely accepted
within the scientific community to be an immutable characteristic.146 Courts
have held that because it is so central to one’s identity, it would be unfair to
require an individual to conceal their sexual orientation in order to avoid
discriminatory treatment.147
Third, laws enacted by the government that promote discrimination
based on sexual orientation demonstrate that members of the LGBT
community lack political power and the “ability to attract the [favorable]
attention of the lawmakers.”148 Such laws include those at issue in Romer
and Lawrence, as well as discrimination based on sexual orientation in the
military and workplace.149 Finally, sexual orientation “bears no relation to
ability to perform or contribute to society.”150 This is supported by the
repeal of discriminatory legislation regarding sexual orientation, the
evolution of the Court’s sexual orientation jurisprudence, and social science
studies explaining that an individual’s sexual orientation does not hinder his
or her ability to contribute to society.151
In 2013, the Supreme Court ultimately struck down DOMA in United
States v. Windsor.152 The Court held that DOMA violates the Equal
Protection Clause, as applied to the Federal Government through the Fifth
Amendment.153 In its reasoning, the Court explained that “DOMA’s
principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and
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See id. (emphasis added).
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See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014).
163
See, e.g., Susannah W. Pollvogt, Marriage Equality, United States v. Windsor, and the
Crisis in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1045, 1051 (2014); Mark Strasser,
Equal Protection, Same-Sex Marriage, and Classifying on the Basis of Sex, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1021, 1027
(2011).
155
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make them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for
other reasons like governmental efficiency.”154 The Court went on to note
that DOMA diminishes the significance of state-sanctioned marriages and
tells both the same-sex couples, and society, that their otherwise legitimate
marriages are not worthy of recognition by the federal government.155 By
placing same-sex couples in second-tier marriages, DOMA burdened their
lives in public ways.156
The Supreme Court invalidated the federal statute because there was
no legitimate purpose that outweighed the practical purpose and effect of
disparaging and injuring those individuals whom the State of New York,
through its marriage laws, sought to protect.157 The Court stated that the
obvious purpose of DOMA was “to impose a disadvantage, a separate
status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made
lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”158 Although the Court
never expressly stated the level of judicial review it was applying, its
language suggests an implicit adoption of heightened scrutiny for
classifications based on sexual orientation.159 In its reasoning, the Court
explained that the constitutional guarantee of equality ensures that a bare
congressional desire to harm a political minority class cannot justify
unequal treatment of that class.160 The Court implied that classifications
based on sexual orientation should be subject to heightened judicial review,
stating that discrimination of such an unusual character requires careful
consideration in determining whether a law is motivated by an improper
purpose.161 Relying on the Court’s decision in Windsor, the Ninth Circuit
subsequently held that classifications based on sexual orientation are
subject to a heightened standard of judicial review.162
Many scholars have taken the position that sexual orientation is a
suspect or quasi-suspect class and, thus, should be subject to heightened
judicial review.163 Some scholars have reasoned that sexual orientation
should be treated as a suspect classification because like race, sexual
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orientation has no bearing on an individual’s ability to contribute to society
and, therefore, should not serve as the basis for a discriminatory law.164 This
argument is based on several lower courts’ reliance on a suspect
classification analysis, despite the Supreme Court’s reluctance to explicitly
do so.165
Additionally, scholars have recognized that the application of
heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation, and
explicit acknowledgement of such application, will resolve the
inconsistencies between lower court decisions and the Supreme Court
holdings in Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor.166 Because the Supreme Court
has not explicitly articulated the level of judicial review that should apply to
sexual orientation classifications, it is helpful to consider the position that
lower courts have taken.167 In applying the factors that the Court has
established to determine whether a classification should be afforded
heightened scrutiny, courts have consistently found that all four factors
support the application of heightened scrutiny.168
C. Rationale for Applying Heightened Scrutiny

164

C M
Y K

06/27/2016 12:34:37

See Pollvogt, supra note 163, at 1053.
See id. at 1051.
166
See Jeremy B. Smith, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should
Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2813 (2005).
167
See Kendra LaCour, License to Discriminate: How a Washington Florist Is Making the Case
for Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Sexual Orientation, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 107, 124 (2014).
168
See id.
169
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 143.
170
Id. (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602–03 (1987)); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr. 473 U.S. 432, 441–42 (1985).
171
See Roberts, supra note 105, at 498.
165
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Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly stated the appropriate
standard of judicial review for classifications based on sexual orientation, it
has established the factors that should be considered when determining
whether heightened scrutiny applies.169 The criteria that the Court examines
are whether the group has suffered from a history of discrimination,
whether individuals “exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristics that define them as a discrete group,” whether the group is a
minority or lacks political power, and whether the characteristics singling
out the group for disparate treatment have little relation to legitimate policy
objectives or to an individual’s “ability to perform or contribute to
society.”170
The LGBT community has undoubtedly suffered from a history of
discrimination.171 The first statute prohibiting homosexual conduct dates
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back to the time of King Henry VIII of England.172 The statute provided
that any homosexual act was “an infamous crime against nature,” and was
considered a disgrace to the human race.173 Sexual minorities have been
persecuted throughout history, most notably during World War II.174 In
Germany, sexual minorities were sent to Nazi concentration camps and
sentenced to death, simply because of their sexual orientation.175 While
such large-scale persecution may not occur today, the LGBT community
still experiences discrimination in public ways.176 Many individuals
continue to exhibit hostile attitudes toward sexual minorities and perpetuate
false stereotypes that harm the LGBT community.177
The military, for example, has acknowledged that, “homosexuals have
historically been the object of pernicious and sustained hostility.”178
Additionally, the general public has perpetuated negative attitudes toward
the LGBT community through their use of offensive language to describe
members of the group.179 Words such as “queer,” “homo,” “fag,” and
“dyke” are derogatory terms used to convey moral and social inferiority of
sexual minorities.180 The false stereotypes regarding the LGBT community
further demonstrate the history of discrimination that sexual minorities have
experienced.181 Such stereotypes include the erroneous beliefs that sexual
minorities suffer from mental illness, are likely to molest children, or can
alter the sexual orientation of individuals with whom they interact.182 These
false stereotypes have resulted in both public and private discrimination of
individuals because of their sexual orientation.183 Based on the history of
discrimination that members of the LGBT community have experienced,
this factor in the Court’s analysis supports the application of heightened
scrutiny to sexual orientation discrimination.
The second factor that the Court examines is whether individuals
exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define
them as a discrete group.184 Although homosexuality was long regarded as a

C M
Y K

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 100 Side A

06/27/2016 12:34:37

10 - SATINOFF_FINAL 6.12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Coming Out of the Venire

6/12/16 11:52 PM

481

185

C M
Y K

06/27/2016 12:34:37

See Roberts, supra note 105, at 500.
See id. at 504; see also John Charles Hayes, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle
of Equality: Homosexuals and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C.
L. REV. 375, 380 (1990).
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See Roberts, supra note 105, at 506.
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psychological disorder by the American Psychiatric Association185 and
society at large, it is now generally accepted that homosexuality is not a
psychological or emotional illness that can be cured.186 Scientific studies
suggest that sexual orientation is not a matter of choice, but rather a matter
of genetics.187 Some researchers have concluded that neurological and
hormonal factors during the gestation of a fetus are responsible for
determining an individual’s sexual orientation.188
While some scientists still question whether sexual orientation is
biological in nature, it should nevertheless be treated as “immutable” for the
purposes of this heightened scrutiny analysis.189 Some scholars have argued
that the immutability requirement refers to traits “so central to a person’s
identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for
refusing to change them.”190 This proposition is supported by the Court’s
decision to apply heightened scrutiny to other classifications that are not
strictly immutable.191 For example, the Court has applied heightened
judicial review to gender classifications, despite the fact that individuals can
alter their sex, thus rendering the trait mutable.192 Furthermore, sexual
minorities’ preference to engage in sexual relations with members of the
same sex is a sufficiently obvious and distinguishing characteristic that
defines members of the LGBT community as a discrete group. 193
The third factor, whether the LGBT community is a minority or
politically powerless, has been a topic of debate among scholars.194 The
lack of political power among members of the LGBT community is evinced
by the government-sanctioned discrimination that sexual minorities have
experienced.195 Such discrimination and moral disapproval has caused many
sexual minorities to conceal their sexual orientation.196 As a result, the
LGBT community has historically been unable to express its opposition to
discriminatory legislation in any meaningful capacity.197 The continued
existence of discriminatory laws, and the unwillingness of political leaders
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to repeal them, demonstrates the lack of political power that sexual
minorities possess.198 While some scholars have taken the position that the
LGBT community has gained significant political power in recent years,
there are still many pieces of discriminatory legislation that oppress the
LGBT community.199 Such government-sanctioned legislation is prevalent
in various arenas, such as public employment, the military, family law, and
criminal law.200
The final factor that the Court considers when determining if a group
warrants heightened protection under the Equal Protection Clause is
whether the characteristics distinguishing the group have little relation to
legitimate policy objectives or to an individual’s ability to perform or
contribute to society.201 While this factor may have been disputed years ago,
it is established today that one’s sexual orientation does not inhibit his or
her ability to contribute to society.202 This factor requires little discussion,
as it is generally accepted that sexual minorities live happy, well-adjusted
lives, just as heterosexual individuals do.203 An individual’s sexual
orientation, much like one’s race or gender, is unrelated to his or her ability
to contribute to society.204
Based on the research related to the aforementioned factors, the
argument in favor of applying heightened judicial review to classifications
based on sexual orientation is compelling.205 Although the Supreme Court
has yet to articulate that classifications based on sexual orientation are
subject to heightened scrutiny, the analysis of the factors supports this
independent conclusion, and many courts have evaluated the criteria and
recognized the need for heightened protection.206

A. Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals Application
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals are currently split regarding the
applicability of Batson to sexual orientation discrimination. The Ninth
Circuit has adopted the position that peremptory strikes used to discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation may be challenged under Batson.207 In
198
199
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SmithKline Beecham Corporation, a suit was brought against Abbott
Laboratories that contained claims relating to a licensing agreement and the
pricing of HIV medications.208 During voir dire, Abbott used its first
peremptory strike to remove the only self-identified gay member of the jury
pool.209 SmithKline attempted to challenge the strike under Batson, but the
district judge denied the challenge.210
Applying the three-part inquiry established in Batson, it is apparent
that impermissible discrimination against a potential juror during voir dire
had occurred. SmithKline provided adequate evidence to establish a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination.211 First, SmithKline produced
evidence that the excluded juror is a member of an identifiable class
because: (1) the juror was the only self-identified gay member of the jury
pool, and (2) the subject matter of the litigation was related to HIV, which
is a controversial issue within the gay community.212 SmithKline became
aware of the potential juror’s sexual orientation during voir dire because the
juror voluntarily revealed that he had a “partner” and referred to his partner
several times by using the masculine pronoun, “he.”213 The court noted that
when jury pools contain little diversity, a strike of the sole member of the
minority group is a pertinent consideration when determining whether a
prima facie case has been established.214 Thus, the court in SmithKline
considered the fact that the prospective juror was the only self-identified
gay member in the jury pool when making its determination.215
Second, Abbott exercised a peremptory challenge against this
prospective juror.216 Finally, the totality of the circumstances raised an
inference that the challenge was motivated by the juror’s sexual
orientation.217 The court found reason to infer that Abbott struck the
potential juror based on his sexual orientation because of the fear that he
would be biased by the concern in the LGBT community regarding
Abbott’s decision to increase the price of its HIV medications.218 The
Supreme Court has held that when the characteristic of the juror coincides
with the nature of the litigation, the potential for a discriminatory challenge
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based on that characteristic increases substantially.219
In SmithKline, because the litigation involved a subject matter that is
of great concern to the LGBT community, the potential for relying on
impermissible stereotypes during jury selection significantly increased.220
After SmithKline produced evidence to support the three-part inquiry
established in Batson, the court concluded that the party successfully raised
an inference of purposeful discrimination.221 After SmithKline established a
prima facie case of intentional discrimination, Abbott did not offer any
nondiscriminatory reason for excusing the juror, even when provided the
opportunity to do so by the court.222 The court determined that SmithKline
successfully made a showing of purposeful discrimination and that the juror
was struck only because of his sexual orientation.223
Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Windsor, the Ninth Circuit
found that because classifications based on sexual orientation are subject to
heightened scrutiny, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination
based on sexual orientation during voir dire.224 In making this
determination, the court analogized the analysis in SmithKline to that of the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of another landmark Supreme Court decision,
Lawrence v. Texas.225 The Ninth Circuit, in Witt v. Department of Air
Force, balanced three factors in interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision
in Lawrence to implicitly require a heightened level of judicial scrutiny
with respect to substantive due process.226
In applying those three factors to SmithKline, the Ninth Circuit first
observed that the Court in Windsor, like that in Lawrence, did not examine
the potential rational reasons for the law in question, as it normally would
for classifications that are subject to rational basis judicial review.227
Because the Court in Windsor did not consider hypothetical rationales for
the law, but rather evaluated the essence, stated purpose, and actual effect
of the law, the decision seems to suggest that the Court was applying
heightened judicial review.228
As to Witt’s second factor, the court stated that “[j]ust as Lawrence
required that a legitimate state interest justify the harm imposed by the
Texas law, the critical part of Windsor begins by demanding that
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Congress’s purpose ‘justify disparate treatment of the group.’”229 The court
concluded that if the Supreme Court was applying rational basis review, it
would not have identified a legitimate state interest to justify the unequal
treatment of sexual minorities.230 In analyzing the third factor, the court in
Witt concluded that Lawrence must have required heightened scrutiny
because it cited and relied on heightened scrutiny case law in its opinion.231
Because Windsor relies on one rational basis case and two heightened
scrutiny cases, this factor is not dispositive, yet was found to suggest the
Court’s application of heightened scrutiny.232
After applying the three factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Witt,
the SmithKline court concluded that Windsor requires careful consideration
of the actual purposes and resulting effects of laws that discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation in order to ensure that courts neither send nor
reaffirm messages that stigmatize members of the LGBT community.233
Although Witt was decided on the grounds of due process, rather than equal
protection, the Ninth Circuit’s parallel interpretation supports applying
heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation classifications under the Equal
Protection Clause as well.234
The Eighth Circuit, in Ehrmann, and the Eleventh Circuit, in Sneed,
have taken the opposite position, expressing serious doubt that the scope of
Batson extends beyond race and gender.235 In Ehrmann, the defendant was
charged with various crimes relating to the possession and distribution of
methamphetamine and ecstasy.236 Ehrmann raised a Batson challenge
during jury selection on the grounds that the government struck a potential
juror because of his sexual orientation.237 The district court denied the
challenge, questioning Batson’s applicability to sexual orientation.238 The
court noted that neither the United States Supreme Court, nor the Eighth
Circuit, had ever held that sexual orientation qualifies as a protected class
under Batson.239 The court therefore refused to interpret Batson in a manner
that extended to sexual orientation.240 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit held
that peremptory challenges based solely on sexual orientation may not be
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challenged under the Batson standard.241
In Sneed, the defendant appealed from the denial of his habeas
petition.242 He argued that he had ineffective assistance of counsel because
his attorney failed to object to the exclusion of homosexuals from the venire
and petit jury.243 The Eleventh Circuit held that Sneed did not demonstrate
that homosexuals were underrepresented and, therefore, failed to make his
discriminatory jury selection claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.244 The court further noted that the defendant failed
to provide any evidence regarding the sexual orientation of the members of
the jury pool and how many homosexuals, if any, were among the venire or
petit jury.245
The Ninth Circuit reached the correct decision and all circuits should
unanimously adopt its analysis. Based on its explicit reading of Windsor as
authorizing heightened scrutiny for classifications based on sexual
orientation, it logically follows that the Batson analysis should extend to
peremptory challenges based on sexual orientation.246 Sexual minorities
have experienced a history of discrimination and exclusion and, therefore,
should be afforded the same protections as individuals who are
discriminated against based on their race and gender during voir dire.247
Although the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits declined to extend Batson
to discrimination based on sexual orientation, they did not provide any
rationale for doing so, aside from the fact that the Supreme Court has not
yet held that sexual orientation qualifies as a protected class under
Batson.248 Scholars have argued, however, that “[n]othing in the decisions
of Batson or J.E.B. indicates that the Court intends to limit equal protection
rights against improper exclusion from jury service to strikes motivated by
race and gender—these are simply the only issues the Court has chosen to
address directly.”249 Because the Supreme Court has not articulated whether
Batson prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, the trend of
lower courts applying heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation
classifications should guide this analysis.250
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Sexual orientation discrimination should be prohibited under the
Batson analysis because it is a form of gender discrimination, which is
already barred by the Court’s decision in J.E.B.251 By definition, if conduct
is prohibited when engaged in by a person of one gender, yet is acceptable
when engaged in by a person of the opposite gender, then such a prohibition
is discriminatorily based on gender.252 This type of discrimination occurs
regularly when members of the LGBT community engage in conduct that,
but for their gender, would be tolerated by society.253 Take, for example, the
issue of same-sex marriage that has recently attracted a significant amount
of legal attention.254 While a man and a woman are permitted to marry each
other, until recently, the same conduct was prohibited when engaged in by
two men or two women.255 Homosexual and transgender individuals have
been discriminated against because their sexual preferences do not conform
to society’s view of traditional gender roles.256 The Court has held that the
constitutional command forbidding intentional exclusion applies to any
cognizable group in the community that may be the subject of prejudice.257
The LGBT community has experienced a well-documented history of
purposeful discrimination and has long been a politically powerless group,
which is evinced by the passage and enforcement of many statutes and
policies that have stripped them of rights as individuals.258 Some historical
examples of discrimination based on sexual orientation include denial of the
fundamental right to marry and employment protection under the law.259
While the prejudicial attitudes toward race and gender have not been
identical to those toward sexual minorities, the similarities between such
experiences outweigh the differences.260 The Court has held that all
individuals, when selected to serve on a jury, have the right not to be
removed solely based on discriminatory and stereotypical reasons that serve
to perpetuate patterns of historical discrimination.261 The LGBT community
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is undoubtedly an identifiable group that has been the subject of
discrimination throughout history and, therefore, deserves the same
protections that are afforded to victims of discrimination on the basis of
race and gender.262
Even if the Court determines that sexual orientation discrimination is
not a form of gender discrimination, Batson should still apply to sexual
orientation discrimination because the similarities between gender and
sexual orientation discrimination support the extension of Batson to the
latter class.263 Additionally, the implications of Windsor subjecting
classifications based on sexual orientation to heightened judicial review
support allowing Batson challenges on the basis of sexual orientation.264
The parallels between discrimination on the basis of gender and
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation are striking.265 Both types
of discrimination are rooted in the same presumption—that traditional
gender roles should be enforced.266 As the LGBT community has become
more visible in society, they have undeniably experienced the same type of
discrimination that women have experienced throughout history.267 These
individuals have experienced difficulties entering various professions,
including the military, police or fire departments, medicine, law, and
business.268 According to stereotypical gender roles, gay men have been
expected to undertake careers in cosmetics and fashion, while lesbians have
been excluded from the workforce and expected to fulfill their role as
homemakers.269 Similar to discrimination based on gender, sexual
orientation discrimination is based on the preconceived gender role to
which an individual is expected to conform.270
Much like discrimination based on gender, discrimination based on
sexual orientation is a recent phenomenon because it is becoming more
socially acceptable for individuals to openly acknowledge their sexual
preferences, without fear of being completely ostracized from society.271
Historically, individuals of the LGBT community would remain silent
regarding their sexual preferences, which was rarely a matter of inquiry
during voir dire, because of the stigmatization surrounding sexual
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minorities.272 In recent years, however, some states have passed
antidiscrimination provisions to protect the LGBT community, and the
public opinion regarding LGBT issues has become progressively
supportive.273 Over time, sexual minorities have become less fearful of
discrimination; therefore, discussions regarding sexual orientation during
voir dire are becoming increasingly commonplace.274
Another similarity between gender and sexual orientation is that both
are immutable characteristics, requiring additional protection from
discrimination.275 While some debate continues over the immutability of
sexual orientation, courts have acknowledged that individuals do not choose
their sexual preferences and should not be subjected to discrimination on
such a basis.276 In Watkins v. U.S. Army, the Ninth Circuit concluded that,
“sexual orientation is immutable for the purposes of the equal protection
doctrine. Although the causes of homosexuality are not fully understood,
scientific research indicates that we have little control over our sexual
orientation and that, once acquired, our sexual orientation is largely
impervious to change.”277 Accordingly, the reasoning of J.E.B., which
prohibits peremptory strikes exclusively based on gender, should similarly
forbid deliberate discrimination solely based on sexual orientation.278
In addition to the overwhelming parallels between gender and sexual
orientation, both classes are subject to a heightened standard of judicial
review.279 The Court in Windsor, while not expressly stating the level of
judicial review it was applying, implicitly adopted heightened scrutiny for
classifications based on sexual orientation.280 The Court noted that
discrimination of such an unusual character requires careful consideration
in determining whether a law is motivated by an improper purpose.281 In
addition to its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor,
the Ninth Circuit considered whether the relevant class has historically been
excluded from jury service and whether that class has suffered from
invidious group stereotypes.282 The Ninth Circuit’s reading of Windsor
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resulted in its conclusion that the Supreme Court mandated that
classifications based on sexual orientation be subject to heightened
scrutiny.283 Because both gender and sexual orientation classifications are
subject to heightened judicial review, the rationale of Windsor suggests that
the Batson analysis should also be extended to peremptory strikes based on
sexual orientation.284
Windsor represents the beginning of the Supreme Court’s review of
classifications that discriminate based on sexual orientation. As the area of
sexual orientation discrimination continues to evolve in the legal field, the
Court will, once again, be confronted with determining the standard of
judicial review for sexual orientation classifications.285 Based on the
parallels between gender and sexual orientation as identifiable classes, it is
likely that the Court will explicitly hold that the standard of review for
sexual orientation classifications is heightened scrutiny.286 Gender, like
sexual orientation, was originally subject to rational basis review, before
evolving into heightened scrutiny.287 If history is any indication of the
future, the Court’s sexual orientation equal protection jurisprudence is
likely to develop into explicit application of heightened judicial review.
While the similarities between gender and sexual orientation support
extending Batson to sexual orientation, there is one fundamental difference
that must be addressed—race and gender can typically be observed during
voir dire, while sexual orientation generally requires specific inquiry to
ascertain.288 LGBT identity is often not readily apparent and, therefore,
identifying anti-gay bias differs significantly from identifying racial or
gender bias.289 The Supreme Court has held, however, that minor
differences between classes do not overpower the similarities between the
experiences they have shared.290
The differences between sexual orientation discrimination and
discrimination on the basis of race or gender raise the question of whether
inquiry into a person’s sexual orientation is appropriate during voir dire.
Some courts have taken the position that it is never appropriate to inquire
into a person’s sexual orientation during voir dire.291 While judges have
broad discretion in determining the scope of questioning, “the purpose of
the voir dire is to ascertain disqualifications, not to afford individual
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analysis in depth to permit a party to choose a jury that fits into some mold
that he believes appropriate for his case.”292 Overall, there is not a
consensus among courts regarding the permissibility of inquiring into
potential jurors’ sexual orientation during voir dire.293 Courts have
generally agreed, however, that individuals are entitled to some degree of
privacy when they are summoned for jury service.294 As such, inquiring into
a prospective juror’s sexual orientation is likely prohibited when the
information is not essential to the case or when there are other, less
intrusive methods of ascertaining juror bias or impartiality.295
While some scholars have argued that the practical implications of
expanding Batson to include classifications based on sexual orientation may
lead to difficulties in preserving jurors’ equal protection and privacy rights,
the primary interests at stake are, and must continue to be, those of the
defendant.296 Although, as mentioned above, there are some intrinsic
differences between race and gender-based discrimination during voir dire,
such differences do not overpower the similar experiences they have
shared.297 While some have proposed that individual state court rules may
be amended to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation during
voir dire, this solution does not adequately protect the LGBT community,
as the extension of Batson would.298
V. CONCLUSION
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Batson should be extended to sexual orientation discrimination
because it is simply a form of gender discrimination.299 Alternatively, the
parallels between gender and sexual orientation support extending Batson to
sexual orientation discrimination during voir dire.300 Furthermore, the
Court’s decision in Windsor, which applied heightened scrutiny to
classifications based on sexual orientation, supports extending Batson to
such classifications.301 For these reasons, peremptory strikes based on
sexual orientation violate the Equal Protection Clause and may be
challenged under Batson.302
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Relying on the reasoning of Batson and the equal protection analysis in
Windsor, the Ninth Circuit correctly held that peremptory strikes used to
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation may be challenged under
Batson.303 Much like race and gender, a party may establish a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by
showing that he or she is a member of a cognizable group that is subject to
discrimination and that the opposing party exercised their peremptory
challenges to remove members of that cognizable group.304 The striking
party would then be required to offer a neutral, nondiscriminatory
explanation for challenging those jurors.305 The court would ultimately
determine, based on the record, whether the challenging party has made a
showing of purposeful discrimination.306
If Batson is not expanded to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination
during voir dire, it will harm the litigants, excluded jurors, and community
as a whole.307 The Supreme Court has held that “with the exception of
voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most
significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.”308
Permitting parties to exercise peremptory challenges discriminatorily based
on an individual’s sexual orientation will deprive ordinary citizens of the
opportunity to participate in the judicial system and may result in a loss of
respect for the law.309
Although discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin are
beyond the scope of this Note, the arguments presented in support of
expanding Batson to include sexual orientation discrimination raise
potential implications for other classifications. In order to preserve the
equal protection right of prospective jurors to participate in the
administration of justice, striking jurors of other identifiable classes that are
subject to strict or heightened scrutiny should be impermissible as well.310
The United States Code Annotated provides that “[n]o citizen shall be
excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the
United States or in the Court of International Trade on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.”311 Based on this
provision, Batson would likely apply to discrimination on the basis of
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religious affiliation during voir dire.312 Some scholars have argued that the
free exercise of religion is a fundamental right and, thus, should be subject
to strict scrutiny.313 Based on this argument, because religion-based
peremptory challenges are not narrowly tailored and rely on stereotypical
assumptions, they violate strict scrutiny and should be eliminated under the
Batson standard as well.314
The Supreme Court has suggested that the Batson analysis may also
apply to peremptory challenges based solely on an individual’s ethnicity or
national origin.315 In Hernandez v. New York, the Supreme Court noted that
if the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude Latinos or
Hispanics from the jury solely based on their ethnicity, the strike would
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.316 The Court’s dicta
suggests that the Batson analysis also extends to peremptory challenges
based exclusively on an individual’s ethnicity or national origin.317 The
Court explained that for certain ethnic groups, “proficiency in a particular
language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an
equal protection analysis.”318
In his second inaugural address, President Obama recognized that the
civil rights movement for racial equality, the women’s rights movement,
and the gay rights movement are all fundamental to the achievement of
equality in America.319 Each of the aforementioned social movements
involve overlapping principles that are rooted in the Constitution and the
Declaration of Independence.320 As such, classifications that single out
individuals from each of these cognizable groups for disparate treatment
should be afforded the same protections under the law.321
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